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Neo-Ottoman Cool: Turkish Popular Culture in the Arab Public Sphere
Marwan M. Kraidy and Omar Al-Ghazzi
University of Pennsylvania
In the past decade, Turkish television drama has enjoyed popular success in the Arab world, fueling
wide-ranging controversies in the pan-Arab public sphere. Such popularity is at ﬁrst sight puzzling. After
all, Arabs lived under Ottoman rule for 400 years, and for most of the 20th century Turkey’s foreign
policy neglected Arab interests. Why, then, would Turkish drama be popular with Arab audiences,
especially at a time of unprecedented vibrancy in Arab cultural production? This article grapples with
that question via a systematic analysis of pan-Arab discourse about Turkish popular culture, concluding
that some Turkish dramas conjure up an accessible modernity while others enact a counter-hegemonic
narrative that puts Middle Easterners in the role of heroes. The rise of Turkish television drama in the
Arab public sphere offers insights into the geopolitical underpinnings and geocultural consequences of
transnational media ﬂows.
The July 20, 2008, edition of al-Quds al-Arabi, a London-based pan-Arab daily newspaper with an Arabist
editorial line,1 featured a cartoon titled “Diseases of the Era” that had three side-by-side vignettes. The
ﬁrst vignette from the left presents a dazed looking black and white cow, front leg up, pupils dilated,
tongue stuck out, and saliva splashing. The caption underneath says: “Mad Cow Disease.” In the middle
vignette stands a miserable yellow fowl, looking as dazed as his bovine counterpart, with stars around
his head and heavy and red eyelids, a tissue held in one wing and a runny nose, with the caption: “Bird
Inﬂuenza.” The third vignette, to the left of the cartoon, features a dapper man, with hazel colored hair
and a well-trimmed beard, in tuxedo and bowtie. The caption underneath the third vignette said: “The
Nour Television Series!”
By situating the Turkish television series Nour [Turkish original: Gümüş] as a craze on par with two
infectious diseases, the cartoonist underscores the rapidly spreading popularity of Turkish television
drama among Arab viewers in the summer of 2008. The cartoon is one of numerous utterances,
including cartoons, op-eds, mosque sermons, talk-show debates, and fatwas, spurred by the success of
Turkish series with Arabs. Such popularity is deeply paradoxical. After all, Arabs lived under Ottoman
rule for 400 years, and for most of the 20th century Turkey’s foreign policy countered Arab interests by
partnering with the United States, NATO, and Israel. Why, then, would Turkish drama be popular with
Arab audiences, especially at a time of unprecedented vibrancy in Arab cultural production? Can
television drama overcome centuries of mutual negative perceptions? Or is the paradoxical appeal of
Turkish drama to Arabs due to broader cultural and geopolitical factors?
This article grapples with the preceding questions, beginning with a brief historical aperçu of TurkishArab relations during the last century and of political and media industry changes in Turkey in the last
two decades. We then proceed with an analysis of a corpus of Arabic-language newspaper articles that
reﬂect pan-Arab discourse about Turkish popular culture and conclude that the two dominant genres of
Turkish television drama resonate with Arab viewers for related reasons: social drama conjures up an
accessible modernity that is not wholly taken from the West, and political drama enacts a counterhegemonic narrative that puts Turks in particular and Middle Easterners in general in the role of
heroes.2 In a shifting geopolitical context in which Turkey is assuming an increasingly central role in the
culture, politics and economics of the Middle East, the popularity of Turkish television drama captures

the notion of Neo-Ottoman Cool, a deeply ironic notion when Ottomanism served as the antiquated
Other for both Kemalist Turkey and the Arab countries born from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
This research is not concerned with Turkish cultural production and Arab audience reception; rather, it
focuses on Arab public discourse about Turkish media to understand how Turkey is discursively
reproduced in the Arab public sphere. Against the backdrop of imperial Ottoman history and
complicated Turkish-Arab relations in the modern era, the rise of Turkish media in the Arab public
sphere offers insights into the geopolitical underpinnings of transnational media ﬂows, best captured by
the notion of Neo-Ottoman Cool.
TURKEY AND THE ARAB WORLD: FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA
History gave Arabs a fraught image of Turkey. After 400 years of Ottoman dominion over Arabs that
ended post-World War 1, Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Attaturk’s forced secularization drive in the
early decades of the republic involved jettisoning the Arabic alphabet and cleansing Turkish of Arabic
words (Bengio & Gencer, 2001, p. 55). Secularism, nationalism, and NATO membership during the
second half of the 20th century distanced Turkey politically from its Arab neighbors.3 Several factors
facilitated a change in Turko-Arab relations, including the 2001 launch of the Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. Self-deﬁned as
“conservative democratic”—not Islamist (Taspinar, 2008)—the new party incorporated democratic, that
is, electoral, politics in a pro-business platform reﬂecting the AKP’s pious and entrepreneurial
constituency in mid-sized provincial cities that came to be known as the “Anatolian tigers” (White, 2012;
Yavuz, 2006). The AKP consolidated its power in electoral victories since 2002, and a series of incidents
suggest geopolitical maneuvering: the 2003 Parliamentary vote denying the United States permission to
open a northern front in its impending invasion of Iraq, the AKP’s criticism of Israeli actions, and others.
At the same time, Turkey’s robust diplomacy signaled an ambitious foreign policy that intensiﬁed
discussions of “neo-Ottomanism” (Fisher Onar, 2009; Taspinar, 2008).
In the two decades preceding the AKP’s rise, Turkish media underwent a structural transformation with
two components. The ﬁrst, occurring since the mid-1980s, is marked by concentration of ownership,
dismantling of unions, and commercialization of the airwaves (Christensen, 2007). The acquisition of
media companies by large conglomerates corporatized and politicized the Turkish media sphere as new
media owners strove to expand their market share and political inﬂuence (Bek, 2004; Christensen,
2007). It was “a period of enormous upheaval ... a period of unprecedented transformation in the media
landscape of Turkey” (Aksoy & Robins, 2000). The second transformation, occurring since the mid1990s, entails a transnationalization of Turkish state and commercial media (Aksoy & Robins, 2000;
Ayata, 2011; Karanﬁl, 2009). Seeking to reach Turkish migrants worldwide and Turkic populations in the
ex-Soviet republics in addition to projecting inﬂuence across borders, transnational broadcasting began
with the state organ TRT in 1990. After a 1994 law regularized private television, commercial channels
began targeting Turks overseas, at ﬁrst mostly in Europe, where they eclipsed TRT’s programs.
The forces that transformed the Turkish media landscape were also at work in the Arab world. Since the
1990s, the Arab media sector has become increasingly commercial and transnational, creating a panArab public sphere encompassing two dozen Arabic-speaking countries, and at the same time acutely
increasing demand for content, which provided Turkish productions an opening into a market that
currently boasts nearly 700 satellite channels in addition to national broadcasters. In tandem, then,

parallel restructurings of the Turkish and Arab media industries, by creating “push” (on the Turkish side)
and “pull” (on the Arab end) forces, set the ground for Turkish drama to enter Arab media space.4
It is in that context that the Saudi-owned, Dubai-based pan-Arab satellite channel MBC ﬁrst aired Nour
in the summer of 2008. MBC is the lead channel of MBC Group, a conglomerate owned by a Saudi
businessman with family connections to the Saudi royal family. MBC Group is one of a handful of leading
multiplatform media companies to have evolved during the last two decades in what is often described
as the “Arab satellite revolution” (see Kraidy & Khalil, 2009; Sakr, 2007). This was enabled by a pan-Arab
satellite infrastructure developed since the 1960s by the Saudi-based Arab Satellite Organization
(ARABSAT), under the aegis of the Arab League. When Saudis gravitated to CNN and other Western
news sources during the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi authorities allowed privately owned satellite television
channels, the ﬁrst being MBC. From the beginning, then, long before the importation of dubbed Turkish
television series, transnational broadcasting in the Arab world was undergirded by geopolitical concerns.
The next sections show how these concerns play out in a slightly different but overall congruent manner
in Arab discussions of Turkish social and political television drama. Nour and Valley of the Wolves, which
generated the most heated debates in pan-Arab public discourse, will be analyzed as representatives of
the two types.
SOCIAL DRAMA: SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ACCESSIBLE MODERNITY
A signiﬁcant proportion of Turkish dramas dubbed in Arabic tell stories about the Istanbul elite and their
problems with love, sex, marriage, family, money, violence, social class, and organized crime. These
social dramas include the revealingly titled Years of Loss (Sanawat al-Daya‘), And Days Go By (Wa Tamdi
al-Ayyam), The Lost Dream (al-Hilm al-Da’i‘), and Forbidden Love (al-‘Ishq al-Mamnu‘) (Al-Yazidi, 2009).
Among these, Nour was by far the most popular. Nour features a rag-to-riches story articulated on a
rural-urban axis and driven by romantic and sexual tensions typical of Latin American telenovelas. Nour
is a young and ambitious woman from the Turkish hinterland who struggles to integrate with the rich
Sadoğlu clan when she weds Muhannad, the chief male protagonist featured in the cartoon described in
the introduction, and grandson of the Sadoğlus’ patriarch.
Set in Istanbul against the backdrop of the Bosphorus and dubbed in spoken Syrian Arabic, the series’
more than 150 episodes became a transmedia event in the Arab world. According to MBC’s in-house
viewer ratings, more than 84 million Arabic-speaking viewers watched the last episode of Nour on MBC
(“84.5 million,” 2008), making it one of the most popular programs on Arab television and a social
sensation. Stories circulated about the popularity of merchandise bearing images of the stars of Nour:
“From the souks of Tunis to the markets of Occupied East Jerusalem, T-shirts bearing pictures of the
glamorous Muhannad and Nour are selling like hot-cakes,” reported Agence France Press, quoting a
street vendor near Damascus University saying that he sold more than 500 pictures of the stars a day
near the campus (“Failed Turkish,” 2008). Other reports discussed the impact of the popularity of the
series on business and tourism and reported a record increase in the number of Arab tourists visiting
Turkey. In 2009 there was a 21% rise in the number of tourists from the United Arab Emirates to Turkey
and 50% increase from Morocco (Bilbassy-Charters, 2010). Some journalists began to see the “Turkish
invasion” of Arab television as a threat to Egypt and Syria, the two dominant Arab television drama
production centers, with one Syrian critic arguing that Syrian serials had received a “knockout blow from
Turkish ...series” (Uthman, 2008). This critique is ironic because dubbing into the Syrian colloquial
helped popularize Turkish drama across the Arabic-speaking world, after the previous success of Syrian

drama (“The viewer,” 2008). According to Arab commentators, the mix of popularity and controversy
that met Nour and other Turkish series can be understood in three main registers: style and aesthetics,
gender and spousal relations, and social values.
Style and Aesthetics
Arab commentators argued that Turkish series had higher production values and scored better than
their Arab counterparts in their portrayal of style, beauty, and fashion. In Syrian and Egyptian musalsalat
[serialized dramas; sing: musalsal], actors’ and actresses’ dress and make-up are over-done, especially in
domestic scenes.5 In Syrian drama, it is a common occurrence for a female character to wake up with full
make-up and hairdo. Many Syrian actresses appear to have surgically puffed lips and chiseled noses,
marking stars and the characters they play as inaccessible. In contrast, Arab commentators argued that
Turkish dramas depict modernity as way of life accessible to average viewers, not only stars and
celebrities. Turkish drama has inﬂuenced Arab fashion trends, beauty tips and interior design. In Jordan,
hairstyles bearing the names of Nour and Muhannad rose to popularity for women and men (Badr,
2008). The pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi reported that Jordanian girls’ “obsession” with Turkish drama
fashion is not limited to clothes and hair but also to eyebrow tattoos and hair coloring, like female stars
in Nour and Years of Loss (Al-Sheikh, 2008). There were also reports about the popularity of Muhannad’s
leather jackets with young men and household items such as bedclothes with Muhannad and Nour
themes (Afra, 2008). Nour was clearly a pan-Arab transmedia event.
One Arab critic contrasted the Turkish Nour with the Syrian musalsal, Bab al-Hara (The Neighborhood
Gate), which topped drama ratings across the Arab world in 2006 and 2007 before the advent of Turkish
drama. Bab al-Hara ran for ﬁve seasons, ending in 2010. It is the most popular series in the Syrian drama
genre known as al-bi’a al-shamiyya (the Damascene environment), nostalgically evoking and imagining
early 20th century neighborhood life in Damascus, with controversial representations: gloriﬁcation of
chivalrous men engaging in leadership and violence, set against portrayals of women as subservient and
humiliated. The episodes are shot in a studio and most of the scenes are indoor. All these details
contrast with a Turkish musalsal like Nour, which “looks to the future and addresses the mind of the
viewer in the 21st century.” It ignores old, “shabby” neighborhoods and focuses instead on modern,
attractive characters, beautiful mansions and captivating scenes of Istanbul and the Bosphorus (AlYazidi, 2008).
Some writers did criticize Nour on social and stylistic grounds, arguing it was repetitive and predictable
with its exaggerated depictions of “sobbing, violence, torture, chases, rape, kidnapping, concentrated
use of guns and daggers which result in repeated visits to hospitals and jails. There are also repeated
incidents of divorce, marriage and ﬁghts over custody ... and ... imposed touristic scenes” (‘Abdulhamid,
2009). There was also religious discourse attacking Nour on moral grounds. Such critique, however, was
a discordant note in an otherwise positive discourse about the appeal of the production style in Turkish
drama.
Gender and Spousal Relations
According to Arab journalists and commentators, another ingredient behind the success of Turkish
musalsalat is their portrayal of spousal relations, with a focus on women. The Arab press noted that
several Turkish series feature romantic representations of loving couples, not only young and hip but
also old grandparents (Shahin, 2008). On YouTube, the most shared videos from Nour, with million-plus

views, are of sensual and romantic scenes. Some clearly target women viewers, with the camera
focusing on sensual depictions of the male actors’ bodies. Censorship of “inappropriate” scenes during
Arabic-dubbing in Syria “in order to protect Arab public sensibilities” (“Nour the Turkish,” 2008) has
prompted numerous Arab fans to download the original Turkish versions of the series and upload them
on YouTube in an act of deﬁance.
Nour is a successful fashion professional whose handsome and romantic husband, Muhannad, regularly
expresses love and appreciation to his wife. Arab commentary focused on the popularity of Muhannad,
played by the Turkish actor Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ, with Arab women viewers. According to several news
reports, Arab female viewers’ fascination with the series and its star caused divorces in Sudan, Syria, and
Saudi Arabia. Salamandra (2012) writes that the success of Nour is due to what she calls the “Muhannad
Effect,” Muhannad’s activation of women’s viewing pleasure. “The most subversive element of the
series,” she argues, “was ... the display of a Muslim—yet Turkish and foreign-looking—male body for
Arab female consumption” (p. 67). One Western commentator went as far as arguing that Muhannad
has become “the standard against which many Arab men are being judged” (Gubash, 2008). Though
perhaps too much is attributed to Muhannad, Nour’s treatment of gender relations was a key trigger of
controversy.
Religious and Social Values
The debate about Turkish drama in the Arab world also took up the role of Islam as a bridge between
Turkish productions and Arab viewers. Arab journalists contended that the Istanbul elite lifestyle
enjoyed by television drama characters does not reﬂect the situation of a majority of ordinary Turks,
who tend to be conservative and observant Muslims (Salha, 2010), or that Turkish musalsalat
represented “a distorted image of Western values, which secular Turkey is trying to imitate,” an image
disconnected from the lives of Muslims both in Turkey and the Arab world (‘Abdulrazzaq, 2008). On the
other hand, some of the television drama characters are shown to observe Muslim holidays, including
fasting during Ramadan and following Muslim religious rituals at funerals and weddings. Since most
Arabs and most Turks are Muslims, expressions of religiosity uttered by Turkish characters sound natural
in Syrian Arabic.
Conservative Arab clerics, however, took action to ﬁght what they saw as Turkish drama’s harmful
effects. The Mufti of the Syrian city of Aleppo issued a fatwa banning prayer while wearing shirts
depicting stars from the series Nour (Badr, 2008). Islamist activists in the southern Iraqi city of alNasiriyya laid pictures of the Turkish actor Kıvanç Tatlıtug˘ on the streets so that people would step on
them to express their condemnation of Turkish series’ irreligious content (“Iraqis surprised,” 2008). In
Kuwait, the Ministry of Education issued a decree ordering schools to forbid students from using Nourthemed stationery, vowing to form committees to oversee the decree’s implementation (Nayef, 2008).
Even stronger condemnations came from ultra-conservative Saudi clerics, with Mufti ‘Abdulaziz Bin
Abdullah al-Shaykh issued a fatwa banning the “debased, corrupt ... and harmful” Nour, which in his
view encouraged viewers to “commit sin.” He also attacked Nour’s producers as “soldiers of the devil”
and accused Arab channels’ owners that air Nour of having “declared war on God and his Prophet”
(Shayma, 2008). However, though Saudi princes and investors control leading Arab satellite channels,
including MBC, which aired Nour, the mufti’s stinging rebuke had no effect whatsoever in stemming the
series’ popularity in Saudi Arabia or in inﬂuencing the programming decisions of Arab satellite channels.

This followed a pattern set by previous controversies—about television comedy, reality television, and
music videos—that reveal limits of clerical control over Arab populations and their media diet.
POLITICAL DRAMA: COUNTERHEGEMONIC STORIES AND MIDDLE EAST POLITICS
Turkish dramas with explicitly political themes also resonated with Arab viewers, especially those
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.6 The most prominent was Valley of the Wolves, a movie and
television series that caused a diplomatic row between Turkey and Israel. Valley of the Wolves was
dubbed into the Syrian vernacular and aired by Abu Dhabi TV between 2007 and 2012. It tells the story
of a Turkish intelligence ofﬁcer, Polar Alemdar (Murad Alemdar in Arabic) who unravels plots against
Turkey and retaliates against foreign conspirators and local collaborators in the name of Turkish pride
and Middle Eastern solidarity. Some of Alemdar’s exploits occurred beyond Turkish borders, notably in
Northern Iraq, Israel, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and both ﬁlms and television series
featured graphic violence against US troops in Iraq and Israeli troops in the occupied territories.
Tensions arose with negative depictions of Israelis and Jews in Valley of the Wolves–Iraq, and Arab
media extensively covered the ensuing Turkish-Israeli row. That season centered on what Turks know as
the July 2003 “hood event,” when US soldiers led Turkish commandos in Sulaymaniyya, Iraq, at
gunpoint, with hoods over their heads, into 60 hours of detention. Though the United States later
apologized, Turkish media condemned the incident as an insult to Turkish pride, triggering anti-US
protests in Istanbul and Ankara (“Regret over,” 2003). The ofﬁcial website of Valley of the Wolves–Iraq
described the event as a US attempt “to be the only power calling the shots. To them there is no place
for Turks in the region anymore” (“Pana Films,” 2006).
In the ﬁlm a Turkish First Lieutenant commits suicide after feeling dishonored by the “hood incident,”
leaving a note that compels Alemdar to avenge his colleague. Alemdar travels to northern Iraq and
observes US forces humiliating the local population. Particular scorn is reserved for a US commander
called Sam Marshall, who was responsible for the “hood event” and for raiding a wedding party in
northern Iraq and killing the groom and dozens of civilians. An unlikely alliance emerges between the
Iraqi bride-widow and Alemdar who together seek revenge against the US ofﬁcer (“About Film,” 2006).
The movie depicts Turkish commandos as unequivocal heroes, Americans and Israelis as unmistakable
villains. The Arab press described how the series features Israeli agents kidnapping children and Israelis
smuggling body parts. In one particularly contentious episode, as Alemdar storms a Mossad post to
rescue a Turkish boy, he shoots the Mossad agent, whose blood splatters on the Star of David of the
Israeli ﬂag (“Turkey TV,” 2010).
Israel accused the series of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic content, triggering a mediatized Turkish-Israeli
diplomatic storm in January 2010, which temporarily appeared to jeopardize the two countries’ strategic
alliance. Israel’s deputy foreign minister summoned the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv to the Knesset
rather than to the foreign ministry, and was made to sit on a low couch, which made him appear on
cameras to be on a lower level than the Israeli diplomat. The Turkish ﬂag was removed from the table
and the two diplomats did not shake hands for the cameras (“Turkey TV,” 2010). An Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs statement accused the series of showing Jews as war criminals, arguing: “This is
unacceptable ... and puts the lives of Jews in Turkey in danger” (“Valley of,” 2010). Furious at Israel’s
diplomatic rebuff, Ankara demanded an apology, which it received in the form of a letter to the Turkish
ambassador. Pana Films dismissed Israeli accusations, pledging that Valley of the Wolves would
“continue to say the truth and expose the guilty,” and wondering how Israel’s leaders could “shell

refugee children hiding under the banner of the United Nations (in Gaza) [but] feel upset when real
events are told by Valley of the Wolves?” (“Valley of,” 2010).
Arab media closely followed the Turkish-Israeli row, casting Turkey as proactive and Israel as reactive. A
headline from this period declared: “A New Crisis between Ankara and Tel Aviv: Erdo˘gan Threatens
Israel and Demands an Apology for Insulting his Ambassador” (Andrawus, 2010). A Lebanese daily
opined that Turkey “does not shy away from its frank position towards Israel ...and exposes Mossad as
the ghost behind many assassinations and maﬁas that inﬁltrate the Turkish state and its agencies”
(Hassan, 2010), while a United Arab Emirates paper wrote that Israeli-Turkish relations have “almost
reached the brink, especially that the Turkish position is brave and resolute in defending Turkish pride
and international standing,” and that it would behoove Israel to be more ashamed of the images of the
horriﬁc deaths it caused in Gaza rather than of Valley of the Wolves (Na‘san Agha, 2010). Valley of the
Wolves-Palestine, released in 2011 in Turkey and Europe, revolves around the Mavi Marmara, the
Turkish Gaza-siege busting ship stormed by Israeli commandos in May 2010. The deaths of nine Turkish
citizens on board caused an anti-Israeli uproar in Turkey and in the Arab world. In the ﬁlm, Alemdar
leads Turkish commandos into the occupied territories to liquidate the Israeli commander of the Mavi
Marmara raid. When during ﬁghting an Israeli soldier asks Alemdar: “Why did you come to Israel?” He
answers: “I did not come to Israel, I came to Palestine” (“Germany stops,” 2011).
Some journalists were skeptical of images of Turkish regional heroism and critical of Turkey’s hypocrisy,
constructing an anti-American and anti-Israeli self-image but also maintaining close economic and
military relations with the United States and Israel. Reﬂecting Saudi anxiety toward Turkey, the Saudiowned al-Hayat’s take conﬂated Turkey with Alemdar, who “does not understand the Palestinian-Israeli
conﬂict” and “does not seem to be interested to do so.”7 Rather, the article portrays Alemdar as
interested in liquidating the Israeli general allegedly responsible for killing Turkish citizens aboard the
Mavi Marmara, without caring to understand the “complexity” of the Middle East conﬂict (Ya‘qub,
2011). Al-Hayat dismissed Alemdar, wondering “whether the world really needs a Turkish Rambo”
(Ya‘qub, 2011). Another article concluded that soon “we ﬁnd that the Turkish wolf is chasing the Israelis
on television; meanwhile security, political and economic ties between [the two countries] would
continue” (Ussi, 2010). Nonetheless, Arab media coverage of the issue bolstered Turkey’s status by
framing the series as a tool in regional geopolitics. In reality, the signiﬁcance of Valley of the Wolves
resides less in its artistic or factual merits, and more in its reversal of Hollywood’s routine
representations of Arabs and Muslims as villains and its gloriﬁcation of Turkish power (see Yanik, 2009).
It is therefore narratively counterhegemonic, though the Arab commentariat’s reading of Valley of the
Wolves in purely geopolitical terms obscures the economic and cultural factors discussed below.
NEO-OTTOMAN COOL: TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA, GEOPOLITICS, MODERNITIES
Several implications can be teased out of the saga of Turkish television drama in the Arab world for the
study of transnational media and their cultural and geopolitical dimensions. The argument that
extensive transnational ﬂows signify a weak state is not one of them. Indeed, the Turkish state played a
role in promoting television drama in the Arab world, recruiting famous actors to promote Turkish
exports.8 By highlighting cross-border media ﬂows on a regional scale, our case study transcends the
West versus Rest binary that still riddles some global communication research in variations of cultural
imperialism and bipolar formulae such as “local” against “global.” Though a history of imperialism
shapes ongoing processes of globalization, imperial dynamics of power, resistance, and accommodation

in culture and politics are arguably most manifest on a regional scale. In East Asia, contemporary
transnational cultural trajectories reﬂect a history of Japanese imperialism, and in Latin America the
Spanish language—whose widespread adoption is the most enduring legacy of the Spanish Empire—is
the primary enabler of a regional geo-linguistic market.
The populist-commercial logic of contemporary media and popular culture makes it more likely to travel
across national and cultural boundaries. As Iwabuchi (2001) argued in the case of Japan’s Asian media
exports:
Unlike traditional culture, by which the irreducible difference between one culture from others tends to
be emphasized, popular culture, though highly commercialized, reminds Japan and “Asia” alike of
cultural similarities, a sense of living in the shared time and common experience of a certain
(post)modernity which cannot be represented well by American popular culture. The ascent of Japanese
dramas is closely associated with the scent of a modernity in Asia that Japanese dramas embody. (p. 56)
As with Japan in East Asia, Turkish popular culture travels well in the Middle East not because of
language or because of a face-value cultural proximity: Turkish and Arabic are mutually
incomprehensible, some migrated words notwithstanding, and mutual perceptions are still often riddled
with hostile stereotypes. Though the Arab world itself can be said to be a relatively seamless
geolinguistic market, the Middle East, with Turkey, Iran and Israel, is hardly so.9 Nour’s Arab popularity,
then, is deeply paradoxical.
The transnational dynamics described in this article call for a multiple modernities perspective that
would acknowledge that Turkey and the Arab world share common histories and memories, and
therefore will gravitate towards similar assemblages of the modern. As Iwabuchi argues in the case of
Japan’s popular culture in Taiwan, the popularity of Japanese pop culture is less attributable to the fact
that Japan and Taiwan live in the same historical time—what Fabian (1983) calls coevalness. Japanese
pop is “culturally odourless” in Taiwan. Similarly, in the case of Turkey and the Arab world, it is a certain
permutation of historical times that cohabitate in the contemporary Middle East, of which Turkey is
currently the most appealing example.
In this logic, contradictions in the AKP’s rhetoric (Fisher Onar, 2011; White, 2012) are not, as some critics
allege, evidence of political hypocrisy and a “secret agenda” but rather symptoms of a struggle to
elaborate a Turkish modernity that is selectively both Western and Islamic. As White (2012) recently
argued:
The AKP in its contradictory discourses supporting universalist principles of human rights while at the
same time curtailing freedom of speech and openly opposing lifestyles that do not conform to a
conservative worldview ...[T]hese contradictions ...express the dual nature of political and social life as
open to innovation while being communally limited. (p. 17)
As several scholars have noted (Bozda˘glio˘gliu, 2008; Fisher Onar, 2011; Keyman, 2007; Özyürek, 2006;
White, 2012), Turkish modernity is politically and culturally hybrid. After decades of Kemalist state-led
modernization based on nationalism and secularism, Turkish modernity has shifted as religion has
become more politicized, economically grounded (in the rise of Anatolia’s pious bourgeois medium-sized
business owners), and the primary basis for demands of cultural recognition (Keyman, 2007, p. 216).
Secularism, once a pillar of Turkish modernity, has been in crisis since the 1990s, as a political Islam

claiming to be modern, and hence legitimate, is fueled by economic growth and a rising proﬁle abroad.
Sacralized, de-privatized, and, so to speak, “monetized,” religion is now a building block of Turkish
modernity. The ongoing syncretism of Turkish modernity, now with a religious element that remains
contested by a secularist legacy, resonates with similar searches for a negotiated Arab modernity. The
elaboration of a selective modernity adapted to local historical and social realities often takes shape in
contentious debates around popular culture and its imputed effects on society. Such was the case with
the reality television controversies that rocked the Arab public sphere in the preceding decade (Kraidy,
2010).
Neo-Ottoman Cool, then, is grounded in a Turkish modernity that has been attractive to Arabs because
it manages to combine a variety of hitherto separate and seemingly contradictory political, economic
and socio-cultural elements in one seductive “package,” what one Arab columnist captured as “[A]
European, Islamic, Secular, Capitalist Turkey” (Khoury, 2009, emphasis added). Clearly a manifestation of
what Latin American scholars such as García-Canclini (1994) and Martín-Barbero (1993) call tiempos
mixtos, or mixed temporalities, Turkey appears to have momentarily pulled off a juggling act—the
elaboration of a uniquely Turkish modernity—which resonates with Arab popular aspirations. Arab
reactions to Turkish television drama and its treatment of social and political issues support our
contention.10
The pan-Arab success of Turkish drama enables a deeper understanding of Arab public opinion of
Turkey. Arabs face Turkey with a combination of desire and anxiety, akin to the ways in which
Taiwanese, Koreans and others viewed Japan and its television dramas (Iwabuchi, 2004).
Nonetheless, Arabs have been so disappointed and resentful toward the United States after Iraq,
Afghanistan, and continued US support for Israeli policies that the mere promise of a non-Western
power rising in their neighborhood endows neo-Ottomanism with signiﬁcant allure. For many Arabs, the
rise of Turkey holds the promise of literally de-centering Western power in the Middle East, that is,
removing the West as the necessary central mediator between different countries and cultures in the
Middle East. The re-centering of Turkey as a pivotal state and a great power that coincides with a
reduced Western role is a foundation of the political, economic, and socio-cultural capital that fuels
Neo-Ottoman Cool.
In this context, Turkish drama conjures a twofold model of masculinity that echoes a dual model of
power. Nour’s Muhannad and The Valley of Wolves’ Alemdar are two faces of the same coin. Whereas
Muhannad is understood as a domestic, attractive, though silent and passive husband (see Salamandra,
2012), Alemdar is the martial, fearless, vocal and pro-active commando. They are conquerors, one
operating through sexual seduction, another through military aggression. Arab discourses about the two
male protagonists establish them as icons of a Turkish, and by extension, Middle Eastern modern
masculinity. If the trope of neo-Ottomanism was invoked by Arab pundits concerned about the return of
regional Turkish inﬂuence (hence the “Ottoman”) but in a different, that is, diplomatic, cultural, and
economic—guise (hence the “neo”), then coverage of Muhannad and Alemdar establishes them as cool
neo-Ottomans, more alluring and muscled versions of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan.
At the same time, the transmedia campaigns built around television series and their stars turn Turkish
identity into a commodity to be personally consumed, nostalgically by some within Turkey (Özyürek,
2006), “aspirationally” in the Arab world. Since the late 1980s, Turkish modernity has been enacted
through everyday life consumerism, which articulates disparate religious, economic, and political

elements of the “package” of Turkish modernity. Nour and Valley of the Wolves are linchpins of
multiplatform marketing campaigns for a gamut of products including clothing, accessories, perfume,
jewelry, and furniture. Nour’s targeting of upwardly mobile women and Valley of the Wolves’ catering to
young adult males, presumably angry and politicized, not only makes them appealing vehicles for
advertisers, but also enables different segments of Turkish society to interact with social and political
issues through consumptive practices, much as Özyürek (2006) describes the nostalgic consumption of
the symbols and tropes of the early formative years of Kemalism. In this context, the popularity of
Turkish series in the Arab world can be read as the result of twin forces. On the one hand, Turkish
capitalist growth requires the successful marketing of lifestyle consumerism grafted onto themes and
stars from television for continued expansion. On the other hand, the growth of consumer society in the
Arab world and the tantalizing possibility that a local modernity is accessible through consumption fuel
the growth of these media markets.
From that perspective, then, Neo-Ottoman Cool is a productive, however ironic, notion to capture both
underlying causes and outcomes of Turkey’s rising status in the Arab world, facilitated by the political
bankruptcy of competing powers: Saudi Arabia’s clerico-religious system is a liability in the race for the
hearts and minds of Arabs, and Iran’s anti-US and anti-Israel vitriol, compounded by the Sunni-Shi‘i split,
has failed to sway large segments of Arab public opinion. Turkey’s allure, with its glamorous stars and its
popular politicians, has recently been complicated by Turkey’s growing involvement in the Arab
uprisings, especially in Syria. Nonetheless, Turkey’s position in the Middle East may become more
central as Muslim Brotherhood afﬁliated parties friendly to the AKP’s blend of religion, capitalism and
electoral politics take over Arab governments. The most singular achievement of the AKP in this regard
might be its success in uprooting anti-Turkish sentiment in the Arab world without affecting a deep
geopolitical shift, relying instead on media, popular culture, diplomacy and skillful oratory to create the
aura of Neo-Ottoman Cool.
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Note:
1

“Arabist” means broadly Arab nationalist, opposed to Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and to
Western intervention in Arab affairs.
2

Drawn from a larger project, this research is based on an extensive textual analysis of the coverage of
Turkey and Turkish popular culture by leading pan-Arab and national Arab daily newspapers and
magazines, totaling more than 100 Arabic-language items published during the last decade.

3

Turkey was the ﬁrst Muslim-majority country to recognize the state of Israel; as a member of NATO
since 1952, Ankara allowed the United States to use its military bases to intervene in the Middle East,
starting with the 1958 civil strife in Lebanon. After Western powers declined to support Turkey over its
invasion of parts of Cyprus in 1964, Turkey sided with Egypt on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War and
denied the United States permission to use Turkish bases to assist Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Because of rising oil prices in the 1970s, Turkey dramatically boosted trade with the Arab states and
Iran, bringing the country closer to its neighbors, though Arab lack of support on Cyprus and Syria’s
sheltering of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan at a time when the PKK was actively involved in anti-Turkish
terrorism constrained the rapprochement. Turkey supported coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War,
signed a military treaty with Israel in 1996, and threatened military action against Syria in 1998 if
Damascus continued to shelter Öcalan.
4

The media ﬂow and shift in perceptions of relations between Arabs and Turks have been unidirectional.
Turkey has addressed Arab publics and exploited its popular culture exports for geopolitical advantage.
However, no Arab country has engaged with the Turkish public on the level of popular culture because,
quite simply, the current geopolitical battleground for inﬂuence in the greater Middle East consist of
Arab countries.
5

Turkish dramas are not perfect in that regard. In one episode of Nour, the female protagonist appeared
with make up as she walked out of a medical operation in the wake of her miscarriage.
6

The two series al-Gharib (The Stranger)andal-Firaq (Separation) told stories sympathetic to Palestinians:
Separation met with Israeli opposition when its ﬁrst episode showed scenes of Israeli soldiers killing
Palestinian civilians, including children, women, and the elderly. Al-Firaq’s writers and production team
saw the series as a call for peace and coexistence. The Turkish government censored some scenes in the
second episode showing the execution of Palestinians, but the Israeli government objected to the series
nonetheless. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself said that airing Separation on Turkish
national television channel TRT was tantamount to a “provocation” and accused the series of incitement
to hatred, while Turkish authorities denied that the series had any political agenda (Al-Bayari, 2009).
Another musalsal, Sarkhet Hajar (A Stone’s Cry) also depicted the daily life of Palestinians under Israeli
military occupation and explored Palestinian political division and social taboos (Bilbassy-Charters,
2010).
7

This reﬂects Saudi anxiety about Turkish competition for leadership of Sunni Muslims in the Middle
East, an economically weak and politically unstable Egypt no longer being a serious contender.
8

The Turkish government announced that it would give prizes and ﬁnancial awards to support producers
and directors to create media products that help Turkey’s image and market Turkish products abroad.
Also, actor Kıvanç Tatlıtu˘g, who plays Muhannad on Nour, was scheduled to visit Egypt in February
2011 on a trip sponsored by the Turkish embassy in Cairo to promote an Istanbul shopping festival,
though the January 25 revolution in Egypt forced a change of plans (Al-Qashuti, 2011).
9

See Straubhaar (1991). For critical discussions of cultural proximity, see Iwabuchi (2001) and Kraidy
(2005)

10

The popularity of Turkish television drama in Greece and Bulgaria and large Turkish economic
investments in several East European neighbors, cautions against imputing the success of Turkish
cultursal production in the Arab world to a pan-Islamic identity or solidarity.
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